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ABSTRACT 
 
This article explores the role of the United Nations in development in the context of both the 
current critiques of the UN and the failure of the 2005 New York summit to reach agreement 
on a program of reform.  While the work of its specialist agencies presents the most visible 
face of the UN’s contribution to global development; the UN through its efforts to influence 
international debates on development policy, in particular as the convenor of international 
conferences, also plays a key intellectual leadership role in rethinking approaches to 
development.  It is argued that in spite of the justifiable criticism of many aspects of the UN 
agencies, on balance the UN has played a positive role in promoting development and has 
been an alternative voice to the major international powers.  Future reform should ensure that 
the UN can continue to make this contribution. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the United Nations has been subject to increased criticism that has 
encompassed its designated roles, its organisation and its effectiveness. In focusing on the 
role of the UN in development, this article argues that flawed though the UN system is, it also 
plays a role in development in its broadest sense that could not be fulfilled by any other 
international body. It is for this reason that it is important to recognise the achievements of 
the UN in the past, while at the same time pushing for its reform in the future. The crucial 
importance of the UN stems from the fact that its role in development it not limited to its 
work on the ground through its specialist agencies, but that it is also an important forum 
where international norms on development are generated and debated. 
In the public mind, as well as in academic writing, the UN is primarily associated 
with its key role in international peace and security and with its high profile peacekeeping 
missions. Even though the original broad objectives of the UN set out in its Charter of 
establishment reflect this focus, the UN was intended from its beginning to have a role in 
development. In the aftermath of the Second World War, that agenda was focused on 
rebuilding the industrialised states devastated by the war. Later, the UN took a leading role in 
promoting development in the global South as the process of decolonisation was rolled out. It 
was the UN’s response to decolonisation that created a new layer of activity and a new 
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requirement for specialist agencies. The UN was also a body within which consensus was 
sought between Cold War political adversaries on the nature of the international community’s 
response to decolonisation, for example as set out in the resolutions on self-determination and 
the work of the Special Committee on Decolonisation. 1  Furthermore, the UN played a 
significant role in the integration of the newly emerging post-colonial states into the 
international system. This post-colonial development role became institutionalised within the 
UN from the early 1960s onwards, with the creation of the World Food Programme (WFP) in 
1963, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCATD) in 1964 and the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 1966. Although the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) had been established in 1945, it entered a new phase and re-
oriented its goals to respond to this new context with the launch of the ‘Freedom from 
hunger’ campaign in 1960. 
Currently, the UN system contains a number of key agencies that work in 
development, and through its programme of global conferences it facilitates an international 
discourse on development and related issues. Neither of these facets of the UN’s work is 
without problems, but they have also made a lasting contribution to global development. 
Given growing global inequality and the failure of development in Africa this may not seem 
like much of a claim. However, flawed though the UN is, things would be worse without it. 
CONTRIBUTION OF UN PROGRAMMES AND SPECIALISED AGENCIES 
The UN development agenda cuts across a vast array of interlinked issues, ranging from 
gender equality, social integration, health, employment, education, the environment and 
population to human rights, finance and governance. The UN Development Programme is the 
UN’s largest provider of grants for sustainable human development worldwide, with an 
estimated bi-annual budget of $7.5 billion for 2006–7. Many other UN programmes work for 
development in partnership with governments and NGOs. The World Food Programme is the 
world’s largest international food aid organisation for both emergency relief and 
development; it is expected to deliver 9.5 million tons of food aid in 2006–7. The UN 
Population Fund (UNFPA) is the largest international provider of population assistance. The 
UN High Commission for Refugees has assisted an estimated 50 million people over a period 
of more than five decades. As of 2005, it had a staff of around 6,540 people in 116 countries 
and a budget of $982 million and continues to help 19.2 million persons. The role of the 
autonomous specialised agencies, under the auspices of the Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC), also plays a critical part in development cooperation. The FAO has a budget of 
US$749.1 million, 2  and provides technical assistance, cooperation and partnerships—
including the Technical Cooperation Programme, information and general policy, direction 
and administration in the areas of food and agriculture. The World Health Organisation 
(WHO), with a budget of US$421 million, carries out essential work in terms of monitoring 
disease, promoting research and providing essential services through vaccination programs. It 
is widely regarded as the central actor in the eradication of smallpox—a disease that killed 
millions until the 1970s. Not only does the UN, through these agencies, focus on long-term 
development strategies, it also has a key role in responding to emergencies—however, this 
paper will focus its discussion on the long-term development role of the UN. 
Criticisms of the UN’s development work focus on the multiplicity of its specialist 
agencies and the complexity of the UN bureaucracy.3 The manner in which the structure of 
                                                          
1 For details of the work of this committee, see http://www.un.org/Depts/dpi/decolonization/index.html 
(1 March 2006). 
2 Annual reports for all the agencies are available at http://www.un.org (13 April 2006). 
3 See, for example, Isebill V. Gruhn, ‘The UN maze confounds Africa’s development’, International 
Organisation 32 (2) (1978), 547–61; James Rosenau ‘Power tendancies, enduring tensions and glaring 
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the UN developed has meant that there is no strong central coordination to the UN’s 
development role, which can result in conflicting aims, confusion and wasteful duplications 
in the work of the various agencies. According to the UN’s founding Charter, ECOSOC was 
designed to play this coordinating role in relation to the specialised agencies. In practice, the 
ECOSOC was not allowed to develop in this way. Instead the structure and mandate of the 
Bretton Woods institutions meant that it was the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund that came to dominate the international financial system and to play a central role in 
setting the macro-economic frameworks for the global economy. Since the 1980s this has 
also meant that these two institutions have played a key role in setting the agenda of domestic 
economic policy for those developing states reliant on their financial support. 
It is widely accepted that the overlapping and sometimes competing work of different 
UN agencies is a real problem, but structural issues alone are not responsible for weaknesses 
in the UN development activities. Indeed Kofi Annan in his report to the 2005 UN summit 
stated: 
 
Over the past few decades, responding to steadily growing demand, the system 
has seen a welcome expansion in its membership as well as in the scale and 
scope of its activities. One unfortunate side-effect of this has been that there is 
now often significant duplication of mandates and actions between different 
bodies within the system.4
 
But, as he also pointed out, the other major difficulty ‘has been significant shortfalls in 
necessary funding’—a problem that has affected all aspects of the UN’s work and has 
seriously undermined its credibility. 
Since the election of Secretary-General Annan in 1997 there has been a significant 
internal reform programme within the UN. This has been conducted in the adverse 
circumstances of a budget whose real value is falling, given that the core UN budget has been 
frozen at approximately $1.3 billion since 1994. Steps have been taken to improve 
coordination and efficiency in the UN system: one such effort is the ‘Joint UN programme on 
AIDS’, which pools the expertise of eight UN agencies and programmes. At individual 
country level, Annan has sought to strengthen the role of the ‘UN resident coordinator’—who 
is normally also the UNDP representative—to seek to share resources (including office 
buildings). He has also sought to plan and coordinate the activities of the various UN 
agencies in a more integrated manner—through the ‘common country programming 
processes’.5 At a central level, the UN Development Group (UNDG) brings together the 
operational agencies working on development. It aims to develop common planning policies, 
tools and strategies for cost containment.6 In spite of these reforms, Fomerand argues that 
UN agencies still seek to prioritise their own specialised activities over the coordinated 
programme.7 In doing so, the individual agencies are influenced by their direct relationship 
with donors and by the competing and uncoordinated approaches of individual donor states in 
developing countries. Agencies can secure their own ring-fenced funds from donors, which is 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
contradictions: the UN in a turbulent world’, in Albert J. Paolini et al. (eds), Between sovereignty and global 
governance: the UN, the state and civil society (New York, 1998), 252-73 . 
4 Kofi Annan, In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all (New York, 
2005), paragraph 194, available at http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/index.html (19 April 2006).
5 Details of these programming tools and procedures and of how they are intended to work are 
available at http://www.undg.org/content.cfm?id=4 (1 March 2006). 
6 Further information on the UNDG is available at www.undg.org (6 April 2006). 
7 Jacques  Fomerand, ‘Agents of change? The United Nations and development’, in Jean E. Krasno 
(ed.), The United Nations: confronting the challenges of a global society. (Boulder, 2004) 162–91: 180–1. 
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outside the control of a UN resident coordinator at country level or even of the UNDG 
coordinating mechanism. 
Lack of coordination and multiplicity of agencies within the UN is often driven by the 
competing demands of donors. Whereas coordination of donor policy has attracted a lot of 
debate in recent years, this discussion has largely focused on attempts to coordinate bi-lateral 
spending in-country and on attempts to reduce the administrative reporting overload on 
recipient states.8 There has been little analysis of the negative impact of competing donor 
agendas (and ring-fenced funding streams) on the ability to coordinate or prioritise the work 
of UN agencies. Moreover, even those schemes often promoted as the best-practice models of 
coordination, such as the joint assistance strategy in Tanzania,9 are in reality a long way from 
a model that eliminates wasteful and duplicative reporting requirements by donors or that 
provide a genuinely coordinated donor support to a recipient state. 
Funding shortfalls for UN programmes and the relative decline of the UN’s global 
influence on development issues—compared to that of the IMF and World Bank—has also, 
in Fomerand’s view, led to a weakening of the UN’s intellectual leadership in development. 
He argues that the early UN secretariat had development specialists who were recognised 
world leaders, including the two Nobel prize winners Arthur Lewis and Gunnar Mydral, and 
that the sidelining of the UN secretariat’s role in the management of the global economy has 
resulted in an asymmetrical shift of expertise to the World Bank on the one hand and to the 
specialist UN agencies such as the UNDP on the other.10 The sidelining of the UN in this 
way was an inevitable result of power politics, in that the Washington-based institutions more 
closely reflected the interests of the US and its engagement with the global economy than did 
the UN. The institutional arrangements within the IMF and World Bank, in particular the 
dominance of wealthy states in its shareholder model of governance, meant that these two 
bodies were not influenced by the needs or views of developing states. Given the UN’s own 
ethos and role in the world and the stronger influence of the General Assembly (and through 
it the majority of member states) on social and economic issues, including development, the 
UN agencies were unlikely to become uncritical proponents of a development agenda 
propagated by the developed states or of a world order constructed in their interests. As a 
result, powerful interests have promoted the role of the IMF and World Bank at the same 
time as the role of the UN has been circumscribed. 
In some respects the UNDP has provided an alternative analysis to that of the 
financial institutions, through, for example, the promotion of the concept of human 
development; and the work of UN specialist agencies has given it a practical knowledge base 
and an authority that has been hard to dismiss. Kothari argues that the critical reports of the 
United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) have played a useful 
role in asserting the ‘relatively autonomous character of the UN’ from the dominant 
macroeconomic agendas of the major powers and the Bretton Woods institutions.11 While a 
multiplicity of agencies does certainly create problems of efficiency and coordination, the 
major UN agencies such as UNDP have used their operational role effectively to assist in the 
UN’s other development function—that of seeking to establish international norms and to 
pressurise wealthy states to increase their financial commitments. 
                                                          
8 See, for example, the following website on aid harmonisation: http://www.aidharmonization.org/ah-
wh (6 April 2006). 
9 Details in relation to this strategy are available at http://www.tzdac.or.tz/index.html (6 April 2006). 
10 Fomerand, ‘Agents of change?’, 178. 
11 Smitu Kothari ‘Where are the people? The United Nations, global economic institiutions and 
governance’, in Albert J. Paolini, Anthony Jarvis and Christian Reus-Smit (eds), Between sovereignty and 
global governance: the United Nations, the state and civil society (Basingstoke, 1998), 186–206: 199. 
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As a small state, Ireland has maintained a positive view of the role of the UN in 
international affairs. This is reflected in recent increases in Ireland’s funding for UN 
agencies. The bulk of Irish development aid goes to bilateral programmes in Ireland’s priority 
programme countries, primarily in sub-Saharan Africa, and to supporting the work of Irish 
development NGOs, and a much smaller proportion has gone to EU and UN development 
programmes. As the development cooperation budget has grown, the size of Ireland’s 
contribution to the UN agencies has grown both in absolute and in percentage terms, and 
contributions to these agencies are now larger than the contribution to the EU development 
programme. In 2004 approximately €66 million was contributed to UN agencies, representing 
13.5% of the overall Irish aid budget and a 50% increase since 2002. Following a ‘peer 
review’ of Ireland’s development cooperation programme by the OECD Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) in 1999,12 and the subsequent Ireland Aid review,13 Ireland 
decided to target contributions to the UN to a much smaller number of agencies. This was a 
decision that reflected in some ways the debate on multiplicity and coordination within the 
UN itself. Ireland had funded 39 separate UN agencies in 1999 but decided to focus its 
contributions on a more limited number thereafter. The criteria for selection included fit with 
Irish Aid’s own programmes and a focus on poverty alleviation. While some small 
contributions continue, spending is now more focused. Among the larger contributions from 
Ireland’s aid programme in 2004, UNDP received €12.9m, UNICEF €8.5m, the UNHCR 
€7m, WFP €2.9m, UNFPA €2.5m, WHO €2.9m, UNHCHR €2.5m and UNAIDS €2.3m.14 
These eight agencies therefore receive a total of €41.5m—nearly two-thirds of the overall 
Irish contribution to the UN. Irish government development policy therefore places 
considerable importance on support for UN agencies. 
 
SETTING STANDARDS AND NORMS IN DEVELOPMENT 
The UN, particularly through its role as convenor of global conferences, has played a key role 
in building development policy norms and setting universal standards in the area of rights. In 
the Cold War years the UN was the major forum for the debate on the nature of human rights. 
The evolution of the human-rights framework, and development as an integral part of that 
framework, is described by Su Ming Khoo as a process of ‘divergence and convergence’.15 
The diverging ideologies of the Cold War rival powers led to the splitting of civil and 
political rights from economic, social and cultural rights. Deep and enduring disagreement 
over the proper status of economic and social rights dogged the early history of the human-
rights agenda. Prioritising economic and social rights became the justification of the 
centralised planning and economic policies of socialist states during the Cold War.16 The 
result was that the rhetoric of human rights  
 
was reduced to a weapon in the propaganda for geopolitical interests. The 
West emphasized civil and political rights, pointing the finger at socialist 
countries for denying those rights. The socialist (and many developing) 
                                                          
12 OECD/DAC, Ireland, Development Cooperation Review Series 35 (Paris, 1999). 
13 Department of Foreign Affairs, Report of the Ireland Aid review committee , (Dublin, 2002). 
14 For further details and a comprehensive annual commentary on Ireland’s ODA, see Helen O’Neill, 
‘Ireland’s Foreign Aid in 2004’, Irish Studies in International Affairs (16) 2005, 279–316 (and see previous 
volumes for each year back to 1979). 
15 Su Ming Khoo, ‘The millennium development goals: a critical discussion’, Trócaire Development 
Review (2005), 43–56. 
16 Henry Steiner and Philip Alston, International human rights in context (Oxford, 2000), 237. 
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countries emphasized economic and social rights, criticizing the richest 
Western countries for their failure to secure these rights for all citizens.17  
 
The outcome of this ideological battle was that two separate international rights treaties were 
put in place—the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 18  There is 
convergence between these covenants to the extent that there is general agreement that the 
two sets of rights are interdependent and interconnected, but there is also enduring 
disagreement over how to achieve the goal of making such rights a universal reality. Over 
time the UN has broadened the concept  of rights with a growing number of conventions, for 
example the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW), adopted in 1979, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted in 
1989.19
In spite of their different ideological perspectives on the question of rights, both sides 
in this debate converged in relation to the style of development policy they favoured. As the 
superpowers’ development programmes emerged in response to the new political situation 
created by the wave of decolonisation, both sides—from their different perspectives—
favoured large-scale projects imbued with modernisation theory. In Africa, the strategic 
needs of the superpowers outweighed the developmental needs of the population in relation 
to both the direction of spending that was emphasised and the political regimes the 
superpowers chose to support.  
It was with the declaration of the first UN decade of development in 1962 that the UN 
took up development in the Global South as one of its priority issues. From the beginning, the 
work of the UN offered an alternative perspective to that of the major powers and of the 
international financial institutions. The UN Commission for Latin America (ECLA), through 
the work of Raúl Prebisch, offered a substantial critique to the international trade and finance 
models of the 1950s and 1960s. Later, this critique was developed through Prebisch’s work as 
the first general secretary of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),20 
which sought to reform the international trade system so that it could assist the economic 
development of the ‘Third World’, and to frame aid as a form of compensation for the way in 
which the ‘Third World’ was disadvantaged in international trade.21
The international economic crisis of the 1970s led to the financial institutions again 
taking a lead in development through the structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s, 
which happened in the context of declining real aid flows. These two trends delineated a 
move towards ‘market’ solutions for development and towards the abandonment of the idea 
of aid as ‘compensation’. In the post-oil-crisis world the status of the UN was undermined by 
antagonism on the part of the US in particular. There was a ‘tendency on the part of the US 
and some other powerful countries to reject the United Nations as a vehicle for international 
action’ and a potential obstacle to economic liberalisation—a response that continued rather 
that abated during 1990s and that exists even up to the present day.22 The UN responded to 
                                                          
17 UNDP, Human development report (New York, 2000), 3. 
18 The text of these covenants can be accessed at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm and 
at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm, respectively (19 April 2006). 
19 For the texts of these conventions, please see, respectively, 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw.htm and http://www.ohchr.org/English/law/pdf/crc.pdf (19 
April 2006). 
20 For further information on the work of UNCTAD, see http://www.unctad.org/ (19 April 2006). 
21 Walden Bello, ‘The Bretton Woods institutions and the demise of the UN development system’, in 
Paolini et al., Between sovereignty and global governance, 207-27: 209. 
22 Robert Cox,: Robert W. Cox “Multilateralism and World Order” in Robert W. Cox with Timothy J 
Sinclair  Approaches to World Order (Cambridge, 1996), 494-522: 498–9. 
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the changing international development situation by instituting debate on the ideas 
underpinning development policies. The Declaration on the Right to Development, signed in 
1986, put inequality at the heart of the development programme: it referred to ‘the growing 
poverty of most human beings…and the increasing concentration of wealth in the hands of 
the few’.23 It shifted attention away from economic growth and profit as the ultimate goal of 
development—and put the person at the centre. In particular, the participation and 
empowerment of people in their own development became a key idea. Although influential 
UN agencies such as UNCTAD and UNRSID offered broad critiques of development 
practice in the 1980s, a neo-liberal economic developmental solution was imposed by means 
of structural adjustment programmes using the financial power of the Bretton Woods 
agencies. The structure of the UN, however, always allowed developing states to organise 
politically—through the G77 for example—in a manner that is impossible in the IMF and 
World Bank.24
New thinking on development did, however, become increasingly visible in 
international politics over the course of the 1990s and the UN was central to this. After a gap 
of a few years in the late 1980s, 1990 saw the initiation of a new round of conferences, 
beginning with the United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries. The post-
Cold War conferences revisited issues dealt with in the early conferences: ‘to assess what had 
been accomplished and to set new goals and strategies for the future’. 25   An enhanced 
engagement with civil society—in the conferences themselves and also in the proposed 
conference follow-up—increased the capacity of the conferences to address these problems 
innovatively.26  
The conferences of the 1990s focused on development, linking it with other key issues 
of international concern; the results included the Conference on Human Environment and 
Development (the Earth Summit) in Rio (1992), the International Conference on Population 
and Development in Cairo (1994); the World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen 
(1995); the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing (1995). These conferences 
sought to elaborate programmes of action around thematic priorities and, although they 
lacked any ability to compel member states to implement conference recommendations, they 
did play a role in shifting the public debate on development and, in some cases, in altering 
development policies and priorities. This was in spite of calls for a moratorium on major 
global conferences by the Clinton administration in 1995. But as the setting up of the 
international criminal court demonstrated, even in a unipolar world progress could be made in 
the international arena without the support of US.  
The UN is, however, fundamentally weak when it comes to implementation. The most 
the UN can do is implement its targets within the programmes and agencies over which it has 
direct control. The accountability and monitoring systems needed to ensure that member 
states keep their promises are lacking and there seems little prospect that the member states 
will be willing to institute such systems in the foreseeable future. 
The Millennium Declaration—and the MDGs 
The agenda that has emerged within the UN since 2000 has sought to use what authority the 
UN has to build a global consensus on development issues. The signing of the Millennium 
                                                          
23 United Nations, Right to Development (New York, 1995), 74–5 available at 
http:www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/74.htm (10 April 2006). 
24 Further information about this group of developing countries within the UN organisation is available 
at http://www.g77.org/ (7 April 2006). The group still retains its historic name but currently has a membership 
of 132 states. 
25 Michael G. Schechter, United nations global conferences (New York, 2005), 153. 
26 Schechter, United Nations Global Conferences,  153. 
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Declaration at the UN summit in New York in 2000 was a success for the UN, even if it 
emerged because of the absence of a significant consensus on other issues, such as UN 
reform. The Millennium Declaration attempts to build a consensus that the eradication of 
extreme poverty is achievable if the wealthy states make it a priority as part of their foreign 
policy. The declaration also gives a very visible role to the UN in the promotion of 
development, which is clearly linked to the agreed outcomes of the UN conferences of the 
1990s. 
The key targets outlined in the declaration were further elaborated into the millennium 
development goals (MDGs), which were aimed at highlighting a set of measurable and easily 
understood development targets that could be used to mobilise support and build global 
consensus on the most basic objectives of development policy. These goals were agreed as 
being the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger; the provision of universal primary 
education; promoting gender equality and empowering women; the reduction of child 
mortality; improved maternal health; combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; and 
ensuring environmental sustainability and the achievement of a global partnership for 
development involving a greater commitment from wealthy states. The MDGs crucially 
elaborated a set of measurable targets to be achieved by the year 2015. Among these targets 
are: cutting in half the proportion of those who earn less than a dollar a day; achieving 
universal primary education; eliminating gender disparity at all levels of education; reducing 
by two-thirds the mortality rate among children; reducing by three-quarters the maternal 
mortality ratio; halting and reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS, malaria and other major 
diseases and reducing by half the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe 
drinking water. 
The actual goals originated in a 1996 OECD report,27 but they only came to public 
prominence when the Millennium summit, held in New York in September 2000, adopted a 
declaration committing the UN member states to the achievement of the goals by 2015.28 
Although they have been criticised for their limited vision, the success of the MDGs has been 
their capacity to re-engage the governments of the Global North on issues of development 
and to offer a simple message to the public to mobilise support, thereby ensuring government 
action.29 Whereas there was nothing new in the MDGs, the UN could present them as a 
legitimate, universal set of principles around which pressure for reform could be built.  
The MDGs are, however, weak in asserting an agreed goal on what is required from 
wealthy states—with no specific targets or timescale set out on trade, development aid or 
debt cancellation. Furthermore, there is no agreement on reaching the UN target of 0.7% of 
GNP for development aid—a goal first adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1970, when 
wealthy countries were asked to exert their best efforts to reach that target by the mid 1970s. 
The fate of the 0.7% target for development aid, while by no means the only issue to be 
resolved, is a good indicator of the failure to build an international consensus. The average 
ODA for the 22 member states of the OECD’s DAC was 0.22% in 2004. This rose to 0.33% 
in 2005—primarily due to large-scale debt relief for Iraq ($14 billion) and Nigeria ($5 
billion) and very large expenditures by the USA in Iraq (3.5 billion) and Afghanistan (1.5 
billion). Only Sweden, the Netherlands, Denmark, Luxembourg and Norway meet the UN 
target of 0.7%. Sweden, Luxembourg and Norway have subsequently committed to spending 
1% of GNP on aid, with target dates for reaching this level ranging from 2006 to 2009. Even 
                                                          
27 OECD/DAC Shaping the Twenty-First century: the contribution of development cooperation (Paris, 
1996).  
28 Details of the text of the declaration are available at 
http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm (1 April 2006). 
29 For a supportive but critical review, see Lorna Gold More than a numbers game? Ensuring that the 
millennium development goals address structural injustice (Dublin, 2005). 
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though aid—expressed in absolute cash terms—is at its highest ever level this year, it is well 
below the figure of 0.5% of GNP found in the early statistics collected by the OECD, and this 
year’s figure contains significant debt write-offs in Iraq and reconstruction expenditures in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. The OECD expects the percentage to fall in the future, not 
withstanding the increased commitments by some states as the schedule of Iraqi debt relief 
ends. 30  The OECD average, however, contains a very wide divergence between the 
commitments of individual states. In 2005 Norway reached 0.93% of GNP and Sweden 
reached 0.92%. The USA—even with a huge boost of Iraqi debt relief and assistance—stood 
at 0.22%, Japan at 0.28% and Australia at 0.25%. 
In addition to the continued failure to agree levels of aid, what the MDGs gained in 
clarity and consensus meant they lost in terms of a broader and deeper vision of development 
that addresses global inequality. Many of the goals can be met on paper in formal reports 
without any measure being taken of the quality of what has actually been achieved; for 
example, in relation to achieving the goal of universal primary education, school enrolment 
may be measured rather than the standard of education provided, or even the average 
attendence. It is the tendency to focus on issues that can be readily quantified that may mean 
that the MDGs could result in yet more reporting requirements for countries already under 
pressure from donors. On the positive side, the MDGs have helped galvanise support for 
development from the publics of industrialised countries. While opinion polls show a low 
level of awareness on the actual details of the ‘goals’ themselves,31 they also show a very 
strong level of support for the fundamental development idea the goals contain. McDonnell 
and Solignac Lecomte suggest that because the campaigning has focused on the broad issues 
and not on the ‘goals’ per se, the impact of the profile given to the MDGs by the UN is most 
visible in the high levels of support for increased aid, fair trade and debt cancellation within 
the EU and Canada.32
In the period ahead it will be a challenge for the UN to avoid the MDGs becoming a 
distraction from underlying inequalities—or a step backwards. There is a need to avoid a 
narrow focus on ‘welfarist’ approaches to development and to keep the focus on the root 
causes of poverty, as well as on the symptoms. There is a strong need to give particular 
attention to the systemic issues underpinning inequality, such as investment in productive 
sectors, such as agriculture. In this regard it is also necessary to focus on stronger 
engagement and coordination with the IMF, World Bank and WTO. This could be done 
through the reform and revitalisation of ECOSOC as a body within international economic 
governance that can monitor the way in which the other major institutions of international 
governance work in line with the MDGs and international human-rights obligations. The UN, 
including ECOSOC, is based on democratic principles, where each country has a voice; the 
international financial institutions operate on the principle of ‘one dollar, one vote’. As a 
result, key policy decisions are made on the basis of technical specialisation rather than 
participative consensus. Many of the policy frameworks have served the interests of those 
with power, and have not taken full account of the political and social context in which the 
frameworks are being applied. Even with the introduction of ‘Poverty reduction strategy 
programmes’, which have tried to be participative, very little has changed in practice. 
                                                          
30 Information on the current levels of aid flows from OECD countries is available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/40/0,2340,en_2649_201185_36418344_1_1_1_1,00.html (6 Apr. 2006). 
31 Ida McDonnell and Henri-Bernard Solignac Lecomte, MDGs, taxpayers and aid effectiveness, Policy 
insights no.13 (Paris, 2005).  
32 McDonnell and Solignac Lecomte, MDGs, taxpayers and aid effectiveness. Poll figures are taken 
from a special ‘Eurobarometer’, Wave 62.2 TNS Opinion and Social, Attitudes towards development aid 
(Brussels, 2005); and from ‘Focus Canada’, Environics Research Group, Canadian Attitudes toward 
Development Assistance (Ottawa, 2004). 
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THE US AND THE DEVELOPMENT DEBATE 
In the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks, the US also wanted to build an 
international consensus on development that was outside the framework provided by the 
MDGs. The new National Security Strategy, although focused primarily on a narrow security 
response to the threats facing the US, also set out the American government’s development 
policy. It argued for promoting global economic growth through free markets and free trade, 
and it asserted that policies ‘that further strengthen market incentives and market institutions 
are relevant for all economies—industrial countries, emerging markets and the developing 
world’.33 The strategy argued that liberal democracy was an essential part of development 
and that it was necessary to ‘expand the circle of development by opening societies and 
building the infrastructure of democracy’.34  
The strategy document justifies the administration’s decision to make military action 
its priority and retrospectively defends the US’s comparatively small commitment to 
development aid by stigmatising ‘decades of massive development assistance’ as having 
‘failed to spur economic growth’ and having propped up ‘failed policies’ while ‘relieving the 
pressure for reform and perpetuating misery’. 35  From the perspective of the Bush 
administration, it is the existence of ‘failed states’ that have been following inappropriate 
development strategies, rather than the international system, that is to blame for global 
poverty. The goal of international development aid therefore—from this viewpoint—should 
be focused on changing governments’ objectives and economic strategies towards a neo-
liberal model. 
A central plank of this new policy on the part of the US was the announcement of a 
‘New millennium challenge account’ that would provide $5 billion (over 3 years) of new 
spending specifically targeted at those countries that follow a program of economic and 
political reform that has the approval of the US.36 The additional aid was linked to what the 
strategy defined as ‘sound policies’, and it was stated that the funds ‘will be distributed to 
developing countries that demonstrate a strong commitment towards’ three criteria: ‘good 
governance’, the ‘health and education of their people’ and ‘sound economic policies that 
foster enterprise and entrepreneurship’. That final policy area is spelt out clearly as meaning 
‘more open markets, sustainable budget policies, and strong support for individual 
entrepreneurship’.37  
In the words of President George W. Bush, this is a ‘new compact for global 
development, defined by new accountability for both rich and poor nations alike. Greater 
contributions from developed nations must be linked to greater responsibility from 
developing nations. In return for this additional commitment, we expect nations to adopt the 
reforms and policies that make development effective and lasting’.38 The policies embedded 
in the National Security Strategy and in the US’s development aid programme, including the 
millennium challenge account, reflect what the Bush administration describes as a forging of 
a ‘new consensus’. In opposition to the ideas underpinning the MDGs, Bush described that 
                                                          
33 White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 17, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssall.html (19 April 2006). 
34 National Security Strategy, 5. 
35 National Security Strategy, 21. 
36 White House, ‘President proposes $5 billion-plan to help developing nations’, press release, 14 
March 2002, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020314–7.html (6 April 2006). 
37 US Agency for International Development, ‘Millennium challenge account update’, available at 
http://www.usaid.gov/press/releases/2002/fs_mca.html (19 April 2006). 
38 George W. Bush, ‘Speech to Inter-American Development Bank’, 14 March 2002, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020314–7.html (19 April 2006). 
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new consensus as meaning that ‘the objectives of assistance—and the strategies to achieve 
those objectives—must change’.39
MONITORING THE MDGS 
The UN heads of state and government summit held in New York in 2005 was seen by 
supporters of the MDGs as an opportunity to refocus attention on the attainment of the goals. 
The agenda was broad and included a five-year review of the MDGs, the place of the UN 
after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks and the invasion of Iraq, the responsibility of the 
UN to act in the face of genocide or gross violations of human rights and UN reform, 
including the restructuring of the Security Council. Kofi Annan in his report to the meeting 
argued that these issues were indivisible, asserting ‘we will not enjoy development without 
security, we will not enjoy security without development, and we will not enjoy either 
without respect for human rights’. 40  The pre-summit energies of key states became 
consumed, however, by the debate on Security Council reform, and the attempt to use the 
momentum of the summit to build on the MDGs was lost. In terms of formal outcomes, the 
2005 summit failed even to produce any consensus on UN reform, the issue that had been the 
focus of attention of the most powerful states. 
The summit did, however, create a context and focus for a strong civil society 
campaign on development during the summer of 2005. In addition, the South gained a 
measure of leverage on development policy, as wealthy states wanted to overcome Southern 
resistance to the proposed ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine, which would permit UN 
Security Council intervention against the wishes of a sovereign government to prevent gross 
violations of human rights. The ‘Make poverty history’ campaign running throughout 2005, 
the report of the Commission on Africa and the activity around the Live Eight concerts before 
the July G8 meeting increased the pressure on OECD states to respond to the core issues of 
the MDGs. The G8 meeting in July made some progress on debt relief and announced a small 
increase in previous aid commitments. However, the biggest single policy shift during this 
period was at the European Council meeting of June 2005, when the EU heads of government 
committed to a new collective European Union target of an ODA/GNI ratio of 0.56% by 
2010, while member states undertook to achieve the target of an ODA/GNI ratio of 0.7% by 
2015.41 However, other than the EU members (and Norway, which is moving towards 1%), 
no other country has announced a firm date to reach the aid target 0.7% of GNI, and the US, 
Canada, Australia, Japan and New Zealand remain well below the OECD average. 
The impact of the UN as a vehicle to build consensus and pressurise states to agree to 
implement development norms is mixed. The New York summit of September 2005 was, in 
most respects, a failure on development; yet the increased profile on development policy and 
the platform created by the summit is at least associated with significant commitments to 
increase official development assistance and with some slight progress on debt relief. 
Engagement by the UN with civil society can improve the downward accountability of 
governments. Governments should be held to account on the promises they make, and in the 
era of the Information Society, the role of civil society organisations, including the media, in 
building this local–global accountability is critical. 
                                                          
39 National Security Strategy, 21. 
40 Annan, In larger freedom, paragraph 17, available at http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/index.html (4 
April 2006). 
41 Council of the European Union. ‘Presidency conclusions, Brussels, 16 and 17 June 2005’, available 
at http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/84335.pdf (19 April 2006).  
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Ireland, the MDGs and development norms 
Ireland has been a strong supporter of the UN’s millennium development goals. Ireland has 
given the goals, and in particular Goal 8, which focuses on the responsibilities of developed 
states, a central place in its development policy. The development cooperation agency of the 
department of Foreign Affairs, Irish Aid, states: 
 
The overarching objective of Irish Aid is the reduction of poverty, inequality 
and exclusion in developing countries…The eight Millennium Development 
Goals, agreed by the UN at a series of international summit meetings, identify 
some of the main causes of extreme poverty in today’s world and underpin the 
poverty reduction policies and activities of Irish Aid…The Millennium 
Development Goals, and the specific targets set to enable their achievement to 
be measured, provide the context in which Irish Aid priority sectors are 
decided.42
 
The MDGs in Goal 8specify a number of areas for action by developed states—chief 
among them being action on debt cancellation, increases in official aid and progress on 
reform of the world trade system to make it fairer for poor and developing states. Ireland has 
supported calls for debt cancellation for many years. Irish aid, however, is given as untied 
grants, therefore the government was not owed any debts that could be cancelled. This made 
it easy for the Irish government to be on the side of the angels on this issue and reduced its 
leverage on those countries who were in a position to cancel debt. The absence of any tied aid 
in the Irish programme does mean, however, that Irish aid scores highly in terms of 
effectiveness and this allows Ireland to play a role in attempts to persuade other donors to end 
the practice of providing tied aid—more than 50% of all OECD aid is still given in the form 
of tied aid.43 On trade issues, the main policy contradictions for Ireland are on the question of 
export subsidies for agriculture—such subsidies are strongly supported by Irish agricultural 
interests but are seen as unfair dumping in developing states. There is a growing acceptance 
that further cuts in subsidies will inevitably take place, but Ireland has strongly resisted any 
attempt to reopen the current agreed set of agricultural reforms, which are due to be 
implemented in stages up to 2013.44 One change that is marked in the Irish context is that the 
policy of agricultural supports, which was considered a domestic/EU issue, is now also 
discussed in terms of its impact on the developing world. However, given the indirect manner 
in which Ireland participates in world trade talks, (as the European Commission takes the 
lead for the entire EU), and the absence of any debts due to Ireland from developing 
countries, it is the level of development aid that has been the key focus of domestic debate on 
the MDGs. 
The focus on aid was signalled by both Taoiseach Bertie Ahern and Foreign Affairs 
Minister Brian Cowen speaking at the UN summit and General Assembly in 2000. At the 
summit, the taoiseach made Ireland’s first public commitment to reach an aid level of 0.7% 
of GNP by 2007 and asserted that ‘the specificity of the language and the timescales [in the 
MDGs] mean that we can and will be held accountable for delivery. If we urge policy 
coherence and precise targets on the UN, we must be individually prepared to adopt the same 
                                                          
42 Department of Foreign Affairs/Irish Aid, ‘Overview—millennium development goals (MDGs)’, 
available at http://www.dci.gov.ie/challenges.asp (6 Apr. 2006). 
43 OECD, ‘Untied aid’, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/topic/0,2686,en_2649_18108886_1_1_1_1_37413,00.html (6 Apr. 2006). 
44 Editorial, “Defending the Cap” Irish Times 3 September 2005. 
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disciplines’. 45  Minister Cowen in turn stated that ‘our aid budget is both a test and a 
reflection of our commitment to the values and principles set out in the Millennium Summit 
Declaration’.46  That supportive attitude to the goals and the focus on the aid target was 
confirmed by the taoiseach again in 2003 when he addressed the General Assembly: ‘At the 
Millennium Summit, I committed Ireland to reaching the UN target for Official Development 
Assistance of 0.7 per cent of GNP by 2007. Since then, Ireland has increased its ODA to 0.41 
per cent, and remains committed to reaching the target by 2007’.47 When the government 
later announced that it would not, after all, meet the UN target by the deadline of 200748 it 
generated a very high level of criticism.49 After a period of internal debate, the government 
used the opportunity of the 2005 UN summit to announce a new commitment to reaching the 
target by 2012—three years ahead of the deadline adopted by the EU collectively in a 
decision made earlier in 2005. The taoiseach’s speech at the 2005 summit also announced an 
interim target of 0.5% of GNP by 2007. The opposition parties responded with a promise to 
underpin the new schedule with legislation—something that Irish NGO’s had called for to 
make a future weakening of this goal more difficult.50 While the Irish state would view itself 
as pro-development, the MDGs have been useful as a tool for holding the government to 
account, and they have also allowed the government to justify increased levels of 
development spending to the general public. 
CONCLUSION 
In spite of the failure of the 2005 summit to advance UN reform, the UN remains at the 
centre of the international development effort. In some respects the stalled reform process 
weakens the capacity of the UN to play a leadership role into the future. On the other hand, it 
has to be considered that some options for reform may be intended to limit the influence of 
the UN rather than enhance it. So currently, although the UN can present an intellectual 
alternative to the development policies and ethos of the financial institutions, its role in this 
regard is weakened by its reliance on the compliance of powerful states to achieve its goals. 
Its capacity for internal organisational and administrative reform is also limited by the fact 
that it is essentially an inter-state organisation that requires the negotiated agreement of its 
members in order to institute change. Such agreement does not look likely to be achieved in 
the near future given the dramatically opposing views that exist among members with regard 
to the future of development and the role of the UN. In spite of this uncertainty, the UN has 
played a critical function in development through its programmes and specialised agencies, 
and through its role as convenor of global conferences. In fulfilling these roles the UN has 
had to handle the growing complexity of the thematic policy areas in which it works, and it 
has had to operate within a political context in which it relies on the power of persuasion, 
rather than sanctions, in order to encourage governments to implement what they promise. 
The UN has sought to act as a catalyst for political change and, through the Millennium 
Declaration and the MDGs, has tried to provide a sharp and focused set of basic goals against 
                                                          
45 Department of the Taoiseach, Address by the Taoiseach, Mr Bertie Ahern, TD, to the United Nations 
millennium summit, New York, 6 September 2000. 
46 Department of Foreign Affairs, Statement by Mr Brian Cowen, TD, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
during the general debate at the fifty-fifth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, 14 September 
2000. 
47 Department of the Taoiseach, Statement by the Taoiseach, Mr. Bertie Ahern TD, to the General 
Debate at the 58th General Assembly of the United Nations, New York, 25 Sept 2003. 
48 Interview with Conor Lenihan, Irish Times, 8 October 2004. 
49 See, for example, Irish Times, Michael O'Regan  “Aid target still in place”  20 October 2004;  Patsy McGarry 
“Aid figures 'disappointing'”17 June 2005; “Government not delivering on repeated promises on aid” [NO 
AUTHOR] 1 July 2005. 
50 Liam Reid  “FG and Labour agree need for aid legislation” Irish Times 16 September 2005. 
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which to measure the commitment of the wealthy states to development and the results being 
achieved on the ground. Whilst this is welcome, future challenges lie ahead, in terms of 
ensuring that the critical questions of inequality in the global system remain on the agenda. In 
the words of one former UN secretary-general, Dag Hammarskjöld: ‘The pursuit of peace and 
progress cannot end in a few years in either victory or defeat. The pursuit of peace and 
progress, with its trials and its errors, its successes and its setbacks, can never be relaxed and 
never abandoned.’51
                                                          
51 
http://www.unog.ch/unog/website/news_media.nsf/(httpNewsByYear_en)/95DC0A888910E103C12570F1004B
6232?OpenDocument (4 May 2006). 
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